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Abstract
The emergence of cooperation among unrelated human subjects is a long-standing conundrum that has been amply
studied both theoretically and experimentally. Within the question, a less explored issue relates to the gender
dependence of cooperation, which can be traced back to Darwin, who stated that "women are less selfish but men
are more competitive". Indeed, gender has been shown to be relevant in several game theoretical paradigms of
social cooperativeness, including prisoner's dilemma, snowdrift and ultimatum/dictator games, but there is no
consensus as to which gender is more cooperative. We here contribute to this literature by analyzing the role of
gender in a repeated Prisoners' Dilemma played by Spanish high-school students in both a square lattice and a
heterogeneous network. While the experiment was conducted to shed light on the influence of networks on the
emergence of cooperation, we benefit from the availability of a large dataset of more 1200 participants. We applied
different standard econometric techniques to this dataset, including Ordinary Least Squares and Linear Probability
models including random effects. All our analyses indicate that being male is negatively associated with the level of
cooperation, this association being statistically significant at standard levels. We also obtain a gender difference in
the level of cooperation when we control for the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals, which indicates that the
gender gap in cooperation favoring female students is present after netting out this effect from other socio-
demographics factors not controlled for in the experiment, and from gender differences in risk, social and competitive
preferences.
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Introduction
The question about whether or not cooperation of individuals
varies systematically with the sex of the decision maker has
generated considerable debate. If such difference is present, it
will probably affect the modeling of economic outcomes such
as household bargaining or intergenerational transmissions,
among others. In the household bargaining framework [1,2],
model the distribution of resources within couples (e.g.,
income, consumption) as a solution to a cooperative game,
usually a Nash bargaining point, in which the threat point is
divorce. More recently [3], developed a super-game in which
the spouses play a non-cooperative Stackelberg game where
the leader first decides the contributions to a certain quantity of
provision of family good, and thereby sets restrictions for the
follower. If women are more cooperative than men, this would
affect the modeling of the bargaining process within couples. In
the intergenerational transfers setting, if mothers are more
cooperative than fathers, this could help explain why mothers
devote more time to childcare activities than their male
counterparts [4-14]. Thus, the study of gender differences in
cooperative behavior is important at both the theoretical and
empirical level.
Under this framework, we provide empirical evidence on
gender differences in cooperation between individuals by
developing a repeated prisoner’s dilemma experiment. Prior
research on the prisoner’s dilemma, social dilemmas, and
public goods provision has found mixed results from a gender
perspective. Psychological studies analyzing gender
differences in the prisoner’s dilemma setting showed that men
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cooperate significantly more than women [15-17] on the
contrary, other studies showed that women are more
cooperative than men [18,19], while others found no significant
differences in cooperation [20,21]. From an evolutionary
biology perspective [22], found that women are more
cooperative than men in Prisoner’s Dilemma games, but not in
the Snowdrift’s game. In the field of economic experiments,
evidence has been in favor of a gender gap in cooperation
favoring women [23]. showed that women are significantly
more cooperative than men in prisoner’s dilemma games [24],
found the same gender difference in the first round of the
game, the difference subsequently disappearing over time.
Thus, previous evidence about gender differences in
cooperation is mixed, although it seems that evidence in the
field of economics points toward women being more
cooperative than men from a social dilemma perspective.
We contribute to the literature by analyzing gender
differences in cooperation, specifically for high school students,
by developing an experiment with 1,229 volunteers from final-
year high-school students (17-18 years old) of 42 high schools
located in the Region of Aragón. The experiment includes 2
phases of a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma, where in the first
phase players’ partners are the same for all the 51 rounds
while in the second phase of the experiment players’ partners
change in all the 59 rounds. The fact that we have a large
sample of individuals with several observations per individual
allows us to disentangle the effect of gender from the effect of
other factors that may bias the results, such as that of the
unobserved heterogeneity of individuals. Standard econometric
techniques used in the field of economics (i.e., Ordinary Least
Squares and Random Effects models) are applied to analyze
gender differences in the level of cooperation among high
school students.
We find that, in all our specifications and phases of the
experiment, being male is negatively associated with the level
of cooperation, with this association being statistically
significant at standard levels. In particular, male students have
a probability between 4 and 8 percentage points lower of
cooperating compared to male students. We also obtain a
gender difference in the level of cooperation when we control
for the unobserved heterogeneity of individuals, which indicates
that the gender gap in cooperation favoring female students is
present after netting out this effect from other socio-
demographics factors not controlled for in the experiment, and
from gender differences in risk, social and competitive
preferences (see 25 for a review). Thus, our results point
toward a gender difference in the level of cooperation that may
be attributed to a genetic factor. The fact that we obtain similar
results when we use alternative subsamples and econometric
techniques indicates that our results are good enough to draw
valid conclusions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2
presents the experiment. Section 3 describes the empirical
strategy. Section 4 presents our main results, and Section 5
sets out our main conclusions.
Methods
Ethics statement
All participants in the experiments reported in this manuscript
signed an informed consent to participate. Besides, their
anonymity was always preserved (in agreement with the
Spanish Law for Personal Data Protection) by assigning them
randomly a username which would identify them in the system.
No association was ever made between their real names and
the results. As it is standard in socio-economic experiments, no
ethic concerns are involved other than preserving the
anonymity of participants. This procedure was checked and
approved by the Viceprovost of Research of Universidad de
Zaragoza, the institution hosting the experiment.
The experiment: Prisoner's Dilemma
The experiment was carried out with 1,229 volunteers
selected from final-year high-school students (17-18 years old)
of 42 different High Schools located in the Region of Aragón
(Spain). In order to satisfy ethical procedures, all personal data
about the participants were anonymized and treated as
confidential. The Ethical Committee of the University of
Zaragoza approved all procedures. 34 High Schools were
selected in the province of Zaragoza, 5 in the province of
Huesca, and 3 in the province of Teruel. For the recruitment of
the students, the coordinators of “Ciencia Viva” ("Living
Science"), a program of the regional government that supports
the dissemination of Science among public high schools in
Aragón, were contacted. Many of the private schools of
Zaragoza City were also contacted, offering them the possibility
of taking part in the experiment. In all cases, the program was
referred to as "a social experiment" and no-one (including the
high-school teachers in charge of the coordination) knew in
advance what the experiment was about. The final sample of
volunteers comprises 541 males and 688 females representing
44.02% and 55.98% of the total number of players,
respectively.
Out of the 1,229 students, 625 played the game as nodes on
a square lattice (274 males and 351 females, maintaining the
male-female ratio), and 604 on a heterogeneous network. In
both topologies, players played a prisoner’s dilemma with all
their neighbors, restricted to choosing the same action for
every opponent (see below). In the first topology, every player
had k=4 neighbors, while in the second network the
connectivity varied between 2 and 16. In the first phase of the
experiment, the network was static, i.e., every player interacted
with same partners throughout the duration of that part. In a
subsequent phase, neighbors were randomly assigned in each
round, taking care in the heterogeneous case of keeping the
number of partners of every player constant. All the students
played via a web interface, specifically created for the
experiment, accessible through the computers available in the
computer rooms of their respective schools. At least one
teacher supervised the experiment in each computer room
(which at most had a maximum capacity of 20 students),
preventing any interaction among the students. To further
guarantee that potential interactions among students seated
next to each other in the class do not influence the results of
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the experiment, the assignment of players to the different
topologies was completely random. Hence, the odds of having
two participants geographically close (i.e., of the same school
and seated next to each other) who were also neighbors in the
virtual topology was quite small. Additionally, the colors used to
code the two available actions of the game were also randomly
selected for each player, thus decreasing the likelihood that
neighbors would influence each other.
All participants went through a tutorial on the screen,
including questions to check their understanding of the game.
When every-one had gone through the tutorial, the experiment
began, lasting for approximately an hour. At the end of the
experiments volunteers were presented a small questionnaire
to fill in. Immediately after, all participants received their
earnings and their attendance fee, with total earnings ranging
from 2.49 to 40.48 €. The experiment started on December 20,
2011 at 10:00 CET. The steps followed during the development
of the experiment were (see tutorial for players in “S1. The
Experiment” in Material S1 for a full description of the tutorial
for players; see Figures S1, S2 and S3 in Material S1 for
snapshots of the web interface):
1. Administrators opened the registration process.
2. Players (students) registered from their computers.
3. Once all students had registered, teachers informed the
administrators via their screen.
4. As soon as the required number of participants had
registered (this took around 20 minutes), administrators
blocked further registrations and initiated the reading of the
tutorial.
5. Students and teachers read the tutorial.
6. Teachers informed (also via their screens)
administrators that the reading was completed.
7. Phase 1 of the experiment began, which lasted 59
rounds.
8. Students played according to some predefined times (a
maximum of 20 seconds per round to choose an action).
During these steps, teachers controlled for any potential
problem using a chat channel that connected them to the
administrators. If one student did not play within the 20
seconds allowed for each action, our software played
automatically for her (see below). The administrators were
able to identify who was not playing, and to contact the
teachers if the situation persisted. However, the
experiment went smoothly and no feedback to the
teachers for mis-behavior was needed.
9. Phase 1 of the experiment ended and a brief tutorial on
the second phase was shown.
10. Once teachers and students had read the tutorial, the
administrators were notified.
11. Administrators began phase 2 of the experiment, which
lasted 51 rounds.
12. Students played as in the previous phase.
13. Once phase 2 of the experiment ended, players were
given a short questionnaire to fill in.
14. All participants collected their earnings and were given
their show-up fee.
The experiment ended at 12:30 CET. The experiment did not
have a fixed number of rounds for each phase, which explains
why the 2 phases have a different number of rounds. We
implemented a repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma where the game
ended at any point between rounds 40 and 60 with equal
probability.
The Game: The Repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma
In each round, each participant is placed in a node of a
virtual network, where participant “i” was linked to “j” (j=2, 3,...,
16) people (whom we shall refer to as neighbors), and where
the actual number of neighbors was shown to each participant.
Participant “i’s” neighbors were connected to other people, not
necessarily the same ones as participant “i”. Participants did
not know who their neighbors were.
About the decision to be made in each round, each of the
participants had to choose a color: GREEN or BROWN (each
participant sees the actual colors chosen for them, for clarity,
we henceforth refer to green and brown). To choose a color,
participants simply had to click a button appearing on the
screen. Each time the participants chose a color, they earned
an amount of money that depended on their own and their “j”
neighbors’ choices. The earnings of each round were given in a
monetary unit called ECU. When the experiment ended, an
exchange rate from ECUs to Euros was established as a
function of the earnings of the participants and the budget
available for the experiment (10 500 €). If participant “i” chose
GREEN and her neighbor also chose GREEN, each participant
received 7 ECUs. If participant “i” chose GREEN and her
neighbor chose BROWN, participant “i” received 0 ECUs, and
her neighbor received 10 ECUs. If participant “i” chose
BROWN and her neighbor also chose BROWN, each received
0 ECUs. If participant “i” chose BROWN and her neighbor
chose GREEN, participant “i” received 10 ECUs and her
neighbor received 0 ECUs. These rules were the same for all
participants. See Figure 1 for a representation of the game and
earnings.
According to the structure of the game, participant “i” and
each of her neighbors will globally earn more if both choose
GREEN (7 ECUs participant “i”/7 ECUs her neighbors).
However, participant “i” will earn more if he/she chooses
BROWN and her neighbor chooses GREEN (10 ECUs
participant “i”/0 ECUs her neighbor), while if both choose
BROWN, participant “i” and her neighbor will each earn less (0
ECUs participant “i”/0 ECUs her neighbor) than if they both
chose GREEN. The earnings of each pair of strategies follow
the structure of a Prisoner’s Dilemma game that represents a
Figure 1.  Earning structure of the Game.  [Note: units are
ECUs that were later converted to €.].
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083700.g001
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situation in which two individuals may defect (e.g., BROWN),
even if it appears that it is in their best interests to cooperate
(e.g. GREEN): pursuing individual reward logically leads both
players to defect, but they would get a better reward if they
both cooperated.
Empirical Evidence
Table 1 shows means and standard deviations for our
variable of interest (cooperation or defection) and several
demographic and game characteristics. We have pooled all the
rounds, networks and phases together to obtain average
values of our variables of interest. Given that we use
information on the previous round in our estimations and thus
we will exclude the first round of the game, we show summary
statistics excluding information from the first round of each
experiment and control phase. We observe that the variable
Average cooperation has a mean value of 0.341, indicating that
individuals chose to cooperate in 34% of the rounds. Previous
literature in experimental economics using prisoner’s dilemma
situations have found “anomalous” cooperative behavior with
40% to 60% contribution rates in spite that defection in every
game is the unique dominant-strategy Nash Equilibrium
[26,27], which can be explained by the “sequential equilibrium
reputation hypothesis” [28]. According to this hypothesis,
reputation effects due to informational asymmetries can
generate cooperative behavior in repeated versions of the
classic prisoner’s dilemma as players may believe that there is
a small chance that their opponent may be altruistic. Then it
could be in each player's best interest to pretend, at least for
some time, to be an altruistic player in order to build a
reputation for cooperation, until the game eventually unravels
to mutual defection.
Figure 2 shows the mean cooperation level of the sample
over the rounds of the experiment, and their confidence
intervals, in the 2 phases of the experiment. We analyze the 2
phases of the experiment separately because we expect to find
differences in the level of cooperation between the 2 phases.
The reason is that in phase 1 that was played first, reputation
effects may be stronger compared to phase 2 where
information on the decisions of neighbors in the previous round
are shown for the previous and not the current neighbors. We
observe that there is a decreasing trend in the level of
cooperation in the phase 1 of the experiment, as the
cooperation levels decrease from 50% in the first round to 32%
in the last round of phase 1. In particular, the spearman’s rank
correlation coefficient between our variable of interest and the
number of rounds is -0.10, and it is statistically significant at P
< 0.001 on a two-tailed test. This is consistent with the idea that
reputation effects is important during the first phase of the
experiment, where players decide without any previous
knowledge of the underlying mechanisms of the game, while in
the second phase of the experiment reputation effects
disappeared as neighbors are different in each round. All this
evidence is in favor of the sequential equilibrium reputation
hypothesis, consistent with previous studies [28,29].
Additionally, we analyze to what extent the design of the
experiment affected the behavior of players. The experiment
was carried out in two phases, where in the first phase players
were randomly assigned to play in a heterogeneous or lattice
square network with all players having the same neighbors
during this phase. For instance, for an individual playing in a
heterogeneous network, this individual had the same number
Table 1. Sum stats for personal and game characteristics.
 (1) (2)
Variables Mean Standard deviation
Round Characteristics   
Cooperation 0.341 (0.474)
Earnings 10.536 (9.621)
Number of neighbors 3.574 (1.504)
Payoff in previous round 10.647 (9.671)
Mean payoff of neighbors in previous round 12.745 (7.712)
Demographic Characteristics   
Male 0.440 (0.496)
Number of siblings 1.117 (0.869)
Following Humanities 0.265 (0.441)
Attending to a private school 0.071 (0.256)
Attending to a Semi-private school 0.277 (0.448)
Attending to an urban school 0.746 (0.435)
N Observations 131,503
Note: Sample consists of final-year high school students from Aragon (Spain).
Cooperation is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual “i” in network “j” at
round “t” decided to cooperate, and takes value 0 if he/she decided to defect.
Earnings measures the payoff received by the reference player in each round.
Payoff in previous round measures the payoff received by the reference player in
the previous round. Mean payoff of neighbors in previous round measures the
average payoff received by the neighbors’ player in the previous round. The
demographic characteristics includes gender (1= male, 0=female), number of
neighbors, number of siblings, the field of the bachelor (1=humanities, 0=science),
attending to a private or semi-private school, and attending to an urban school.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083700.t001
Figure 2.  Mean cooperation, by round.  [Notes: cooperation
is defined as the mean value of a dummy variable that takes
value “1” if the individual cooperates in the round of reference,
and takes value “0· for defection. “Experiment” was played in
the first phase of the experiment; “Control” was played in the
second phase of the experiment. Round number goes from 1 to
58.].
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083700.g002
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of neighbors, and neighbors were always the same (e.g., same
identities) during all the rounds of this phase of the experiment
(e.g., static network). Later, in the second phase of the
experiment, the same individuals played in the same type of
network (e.g., heterogeneous or square lattice) but now
neighbors were different in each round (e.g., dynamic network).
If we find substantial differences in the level of cooperation
between the two phases, such differences may be attributed to
differences in the behavior of individuals due to the type of
network (e.g., static versus dynamic), given that the same
individuals were assigned to the same network (e.g.,
heterogeneous or square lattice) in the two phases. We do not
consider differences in the behavior of individuals between the
heterogeneous and the square lattice network, as previous
evidence has found no evidence of behavior depending of the
type of network [30,31]. Such differences may be due to the
fact that individuals may have learned how to play during the
first phase, approaching the Nash-Equilibrium solution in the
second phase.
Comparing the level of cooperation between the two phases,
the mean cooperation level in phase 1 is 0.386 with a standard
deviation of 0.487 (n=62679), while the mean cooperation level
in the control phase is 0.307 with a standard deviation of 0.461
(n=71282). A t-type test of means of the variable for the two
subsamples indicates that the difference is statistically
significant at the 99% level (p<0.0001), and thus a raw
comparison of the data indicates that the cooperation level is
slightly lower in the second phase compared to the first one.
Nevertheless, such a difference in cooperation could be
explained by the “reputation hypothesis” and disappears over
time as the reputation effect disappears. Thus, we next analyze
how differences in the level of cooperation by phase evolved
during the experiment. Figure 2 shows the mean level of
cooperation over the experiment, by phase, and the confidence
intervals of the mean level of cooperation. We first observe that
the overall cooperation in phase 1 is larger than the overall
cooperation in phase 2 in all the rounds of the experiment.
However, looking at the confidence intervals for each phase,
the negative confidence interval for the observations of phase 1
(x̄ 1−1.96SE1) does not overlap with the positive confidence
interval for observations of phase 2 (x̄ 2−1.96SE2) in the first 20
rounds, but afterwards level of cooperation is similar in the two
phases of the experiment (x̄ 1and SE1 measures the average
cooperation and the standard error in cooperation in each
round of phase 1 of the experiment. x̄ 2and SE2 measures the
average cooperation and the standard error in cooperation in
each round of phase 2 the experiment). Thus, we find evidence
that the gap in cooperation decreases over time, reaching
similar levels of cooperation later in the game. This may
indicate that the reputation hypothesis played a role in shaping
individuals’ behavior in the first phase of the experiment,
disappearing at later stages. Also, this evidence suggests that
the two phases of the experiment must be analyzed separately.
Considering the overall earnings obtained by students, in
each round the mean earning is 10.536, and the mean number
of neighbors is 3.574. We also consider the earnings obtained
in previous rounds for both participants and the participant’s
neighbors. Since this information is shown to players in each
round, we use this information as a proxy to study the effect of
previous actions on the behavior of individuals. In particular, we
compute the earnings obtained by the participant in the
previous round, and the overall earnings obtained by the
participant’s neighbors in the previous round.
For the payoffs obtained by respondent’s neighbors in the
previous round, here we must take into account that while the
number of neighbors is fixed in the square lattice network (e.g.,
four), it varies between 2 and 16 in the heterogeneous network,
and thus we need to summarize neighbors’ earnings in a single
variable to avoid losing observations. Consider students who
have 16 neighbors, compared to students who have less than
16 neighbors. If we want to introduce variables for the earnings
of each neighbor, we will need 16 variables for students who
have 16 neighbors. For students who have less than 16
neighbors, some of these 16 variables would contain no
values, and thus these students would be dropped out from
estimations as they would include missing values in the
neighbors’ variables. We cannot compute the information of the
previous round in round 1, as it is the beginning of each phase
and there is no previous round, so we will exclude round 1 of
each phase during the empirical analysis. In particular, for
neighbors’ earnings in the previous round we have done the
sum of the variable of earnings for all the neighbors in the
previous round (e.g., what current neighbor played in the
previous round) and then divided the sum by the number of
neighbors, which yields an average value of the neighbors’
earnings in the previous round. Table 1 shows the average
values of the earnings obtained by participants and the mean
earnings of neighbors in previous rounds, and we observe that
overall earnings obtained in the previous round and mean
overall earnings of neighbors are 10.65 and 12.75 ECUs.
Considering the raw gender difference in cooperation, the
average cooperation level of female players during the
experiment is 0.375 with an standard deviation of 0.484
(n=74992), while the average cooperation level for male
players is 0.304 with an standard deviation of 0.460, and a t-
type test of means of the variable for the 2 subsamples
indicates that the difference is statistically significant at the
99% level (p<0.0001). Thus, a raw comparison of the data
indicates that female students have a higher probability of
cooperation compared to male students in the experiment.
However, previous evidence has shown that gender
differences in cooperation are present during the first rounds of
a repeated experiment, but that gender differences disappear
over time [24]. Thus, we next analyze how differences in the
level of cooperation by gender evolved during the experiment.
Figure 3 shows the mean level of cooperation over the
experiment, by gender, and the confidence intervals of the
mean level of cooperation. We first observe that the overall
cooperation for female players is larger than the overall
cooperation for male players in all the rounds of the
experiment. Additionally, looking at the confidence intervals for
each gender, in most cases the negative confidence interval for
female players (x̄ f −1.96SE f ) does not overlap with the
positive confidence interval for male players (x̄ m−1.96SEm),
indicating that there is a statistically significant gender gap in
cooperation throughout the different rounds of the experiment
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(x̄ f and SEf measures the average cooperation and the
standard error in cooperation for female students in each round
of the experiment. x̄ mand SEm measures the average
cooperation and the standard error in cooperation for male
students in each round of the experiment). Thus, we find
evidence that the gender gap in cooperation favoring female
students does not disappear over time.
Empirical Strategy
As a first specification, we estimate Ordinary Least Squares
(OLS) regressions on the decision to cooperate or to defect.
We estimate the following equation:
Cijt=α+βXi+δGamei jt+εijt (1)
where Cijt represents the decision (cooperation/defection) by
participant “i” in network “j” at round “t”. The dependent variable
is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if individual “i” in
network “j” at round “t” decided to cooperate, and takes value 0
if he/she decided to defect. The vector Xi includes participant’s
“i” demographic characteristics such as gender (1= male,
0=female), number of siblings, the field of the bachelor
(1=humanities, 0=science), whether the student attended a
private (1=yes, o=no) or semi-private (1=yes, 0=no), and
whether the high school is located in an urban area (1=yes,
0=no) or not. Gameijt includes game variables. εijt is a random
variable (e..g., standard errors) that represents unmeasured
factors, capturing all the factors that may affect participant’s
decisions and for what we do not have information, and we
assume thatεijt~N(0,σ2). We cluster observations by individual
to allow for differences in the standard errors due to arbitrary
intra-individual correlation.
We have estimated Equation (1) using 6 different samples:
1) individuals playing in the heterogeneous network in phase 1,
2) individuals playing in the square lattice network in phase 1,
Figure 3.  Mean cooperation, by round and gender.  [Notes:
cooperation is defined as the mean value of a dummy variable
that takes value “1” if the individual cooperates in the round of
reference, and takes value “0· for defection. Round number
goes from 1 to 58. Confidence intervals (CI) are defined at the
95% level. Red lines show the CI for men, and blue lines show
the CI for women.].
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083700.g003
3) individuals playing in the heterogeneous and the square
lattice networks during in phase 1, 4) individuals playing in the
heterogeneous network in phase 2, 5) individuals playing in the
square lattice network in phase 2, and 6) individuals playing in
the heterogeneous and the square lattice networks during the
phase The reason to estimate with different samples is to see if
results are consistent to sample selection and network
selection issues. If we obtain different results in different
subsamples, it could be that networks may have effects on the
decisions process of individuals, or because individuals
selected into the different networks are different.
Gameijt includes the following variables: the round number
(j=1,2...51), the number of neighbors participant “i” is playing
with, participant’s earning in the previous round, and the mean
earning of neighbors in the previous round. Given that we have
an iterative game, and students are shown in each round the
earnings and the decision their current neighbors played in the
previous round (see Figures S1, S2 and S3 in Material S1 for
an example of the screen students are shown during the
game), we include these variables to see whether or not
participant and neighbors’ decisions in previous rounds affect
the behavior of players.
We also estimate models that take into account the
unobserved heterogeneity of individuals, since there may be
some unobserved factors at the individual level that may be
correlated with the cooperation decision, and thus results
based on Equation (1) may be biased. For instance, past
personal experiences, mood in the day of the experiment, or
personal attitudes towards justice, equity and confidence may
condition the decisions of individuals of our experiment, and if
we do not take into account such differences the coefficient β in
Equation (1) would be capturing the effects of such unobserved
differences and not the real of factors such as gender. Thus,
we estimate a random-effects linear probability model to control
for unobserved heterogeneity of individuals (since we are
interested on how the level of cooperation depends on gender
and the number of neighbors, among others, we cannot use a
fixed-effects estimator since these variables would be
eliminated from estimates, and hence the random-effect
estimator is preferable for our purpose), where we use the
following equation:
Cijt=αi+βXi+δGamei jt+εijt (2)
Here Cijt represents the decision (cooperation/defection) by
individual “i” in network “j” at round “t”, and αirepresent the
individual effect. The time variation needed to estimate a panel
data model is given by the fact that respondents played more
than one round during each phase.
The fact that the data allows to control for the unobserved
heterogeneity of individuals makes the linear probability model
particularly attractive with respect to other models such as the
Probit model. Although the linear probability model may not
provide a very good estimate of the partial effects at extreme
values of the independent variables, it still produces a
consistent and even unbiased estimator of the partial effects on
the response probability averaged across the distribution of the
independent variable. We have also estimated Probit models
on the same subsamples, and results are consistent to the
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OLS results. See “S2. Probit results” in Material S1 for a
description of the model and the estimation results.
Results
Columns (1) to (6) in Table 2 show the results of estimating
Equation (1) for the six subsamples mentioned above.
Considering the effect of gender on the level of cooperation of
individuals, we observe negative and statistically significant
associations between being male and the probability of
cooperation in all the analyzed samples, with these
associations being statistically significant at standard levels. In
particular, we find that being male is associated with a
decrease of between 4 (Column (1)) and 8 (Column (4))
percentage points in the probability of cooperation. Considering
that the mean level of cooperation during the experiment is
0.341, we find that female players have a higher probability of
between 11 and 23 percentage points to cooperate, compared
to male players. This negative association between being male
and cooperation is present when we analyze alternative
samples and networks (e.g., phase 1 versus phase 2), and is
net out of the effects of other demographic characteristics. For
instance, it could be that the number of siblings of the
respondent conditions his/her cooperative behavior, fostering
the level of cooperation of the individuals as he/she is more
used to intra-household bargaining. Also, it could be that
children who attend a private school observe a higher
household income, which may make those children to give a
relative lower value to the payoffs offered during the game,
affecting their behavior. These and more factors may be driving
our results, and thus we need to control for these
characteristics in our estimations to net out the effect of gender
from other effects.
Table 2. OLS Regressions for cooperation of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma.






Het + Sq Lattice
Experiment Heterogenous ControlSq. Lattice Control
Het + Sq Lattice
Control
Male -0.038*** -0.061*** -0.050*** -0.081*** -0.068*** -0.073***
 (0.013) (0.012) (0.009) (0.016) (0.016) (0.012)
Round number -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of neighbors -0.004 - -0.004 -0.001 - -0.002
 (0.004) - (0.003) (0.004) - (0.004)
Humanities 0.012 0.037*** 0.024** 0.020 0.028 0.025**
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013)
Number of siblings 0.004 0.000 0.002 -0.012 0.009 0.000
 (0.007) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006)
Attending a private school 0.017 -0.040** -0.017 0.041 -0.027 0.000
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.016) (0.033) (0.026) (0.021)
Attending a Semi-private
school
-0.010 -0.016 -0.013 0.010 -0.024 -0.008
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.010) (0.019) (0.019) (0.013)
Attending an urban school -0.001 -0.010 -0.006 -0.032* -0.010 -0.022
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.010) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014)
Mean payoff of neighbors in
previous round
0.004*** 0.009*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.001 0.000
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Payoff in previous round -0.003*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.007***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.475*** 0.395*** 0.458*** 0.480*** 0.432*** 0.462***
 (0.021) (0.021) (0.017) (0.023) (0.024) (0.020)
Observations 30200 31250 61450 34428 35625 70053
Number of id 604 625 1229 625 604 1229
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Note: Sample consists of final-year high school students from Aragon (Spain). Clustered standard errors in parenthesis. We estimate the following equation: Cijt=α+βXi
+δGameijt+εijtwhere Cijt represents the decision (cooperation/defection) by individual “i” in network “j” at round “t”. The dependent variables is a dummy variable that takes
value 1 if individual “i” in network “j” at round “t” decided to cooperate, and takes value 0 if he/she decided to defect. The vector Xi includes participant’s “i” demographic
characteristics such as gender (1= male, 0=female), number of siblings, the field of the bachelor (1=humanities, 0=science), while Gameijt includes game variables from the
previous round. We cluster observations by individual to allow for differences in the variance/standard errors due to arbitrary intra-individual correlation. *** Significant at the
1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083700.t002
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Other factors affecting the level of cooperation of individuals
are the round number, the respondent’s payoff in the previous
round, and the mean payoff of neighbors in the previous round.
In the case of the round number, we observe a negative and
statistically significant association between the round number
and the level of cooperation in both phase 1 (Columns (1) to
(3)) and phase 2 of the experiment (Columns (4) to (6)). In
particular, we find that an additional round in the experiment
decreases the probability of cooperation by 0.3 and 0.1
percentage points in phase 1 and 2 of the experiment. These
results are consistent with the “sequential equilibrium
reputation hypothesis” since the cooperation level decreases
as the game unravels to mutual defection. However, we
observe that the effect of the round in the level of cooperation
is lower in the phase 2 of the experiment, which may indicate
that the reputation hypothesis has a smaller effect in phase 2 of
the experiment where players may have learned that reputation
is not an underlying mechanism operating during the game, or
they may have realized that as their neighbors change in every
round the idea of reputation does not apply.
Respondent’s payoff in the previous round has a negative
and statistically significant association with the probability of
cooperation. In particular, each additional ECU obtained in the
previous round is related with decreases in the probability of
cooperation of around 0.4 percentage points in phase 1 of the
experiment, and of around 0.07 percentage points in phase 2
of the experiment. One explanation for this reported
association is that if respondent has defected in the previous
round, and he/she has obtained a high payoff in the previous
round, the respondent is in a “defection mood” to try to obtain a
high payoff in the current round. The opposite applies for the
mean payoffs obtained by neighbors in the previous round, as
it has a positive and statistically significant association with the
level of cooperation. Furthermore, this positive association is
not present in the phase 2 of the experiment, where neighbors
are different in each round. Our experimental findings suggest
that the behavior of the players depends on the previous
actions of their neighbors (conditional cooperation), but may
also depend on the previous action of the players themselves
(moody conditional cooperation), indicating that players seem
to react to the context in a way influenced by their own
previous action [32,33]. However, it is only for static networks
where the “moody conditional cooperation” is present,
indicating that in networks where neighbors change during the
process the behavior of players does not depend on their
neighbors. This, in fact, reinforces our interpretation that
players realize the difference between the two treatments and
act accordingly.
Previous research on gender differences in economic
experiments has shown that there are gender differences in
risk, social and competitive preferences (see 25 for a review).
Additionally, there can be other socio-demographic factors not
controlled for in the experiment, such as the respondent’s
household income, that can be correlated with the higher level
cooperation of women. Thus, the previously observed gender
difference in cooperation could be attributed to gender
differences in preferences, or to non-controlled socio-
demographic factors. For this reason, we need to apply an
econometric technique that nets out the effect of gender from
other observed (although not controlled for) and unobserved
factors (e.g., preferences). If we now consider that our dataset
has a panel data structure (e.g., same individuals observed
during several periods of time), we can apply the Random
Effect estimator [34] to estimate the effect of gender on
cooperation net out of observed and unobserved
heterogeneity.
Columns (1) to (6) in Table 3 show the results of estimating
Equation (2) for the six subsamples we are working with. We
observe negative and statistically significant associations
between being male and the probability of cooperation in all the
analyzed samples, with these associations being statistically
significant at standard levels. In particular, we find that being
male is associated with a decrease of between 4 (Column (1))
and 8 (Column (4)) percentage points in the probability of
cooperation. For the rest of factors, our results are consistent
compared to the OLS results, and indicate that our
observations cannot be attributed to non-controlled factors.
Conclusions
The question about whether or not cooperation of individuals
varies systematically with the sex of the decision maker is
analyzed in this paper. Prior research on the prisoner’s
dilemma, social dilemmas, and public goods provision has
found mixed results from a gender perspective. We contribute
to the literature by analyzing gender differences in cooperation
for Spanish high school students. To that end, we reanalyzed
data from an experiment with 1,229 volunteers from final-year
high-school students (17-18 years old) of 42 high schools
located in the Region of Aragón. Standard econometric
techniques used in the field of economics (i.e., Ordinary Least
Squares, and Random Effects models) are applied to analyze
gender differences in the level of cooperation of Aragonians
high school students.
We find that being male is negatively associated with the
level of cooperation, with this association being statistically
significant at standard levels. We also obtain a gender
difference in the level of cooperation when we control for the
unobserved heterogeneity of individuals, which indicates that
the gender gap in cooperation favoring female students is
present after netting out this effect from other socio-
demographics factors not controlled for in the experiment, and
from gender differences in risk, social and competitive
preferences (see 25 for a review). Thus, our results point
toward a gender difference in the level of cooperation that
might be attributed to a genetic factor.
We hope that this article will serve as a resource for those in
the field of economics seeking to understand gender
differences in the level of cooperation, and to use it as a
starting point to illuminate the debate on genetic differences in
behavior. We urge researchers to routinely record the gender
of the participants when possible in order to expand our
understanding of gender differences. Having established this
gender difference, it is appropriate now for research to address
the issue of how other parameters of the experimental setting
influence the behavior of women and men. For instance,
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gender may affect how individuals punish non-cooperative
partners, one of the most relevant mechanisms to foster
cooperation [35-37]. In the same spirit, when players can
choose their partners by rewiring their connections [38-40]
gender may also be responsible for different behaviors. Finally,
to the extent that our findings support the existence of gender
differences in cooperation, the theory used to model some
economic outcomes, such as household bargaining, could
incorporate this gender asymmetry. We leave all these issues
for future research.
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Table 3. Random effects regressions for cooperation of individuals playing the Prisoner’s Dilemma.






Het + Sq Lattice
Experiment Heterogenous ControlSq. Lattice Control
Het + Sq Lattice
Control
Male -0.038*** -0.063*** -0.051*** -0.082*** -0.069*** -0.074***
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.009) (0.014) (0.013) (0.010)
Round number -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of neighbors -0.008** - -0.007** -0.005 - -0.007**
 (0.003) - (0.003) (0.004) - (0.003)
Humanities 0.011 0.038*** 0.025** 0.020 0.028* 0.026**
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.017) (0.015) (0.011)
Number of Brothers 0.004 0.001 0.002 -0.012 0.009 0.001
 (0.008) (0.006) (0.005) (0.009) (0.007) (0.006)
Attending a private school 0.018 -0.040** -0.018 0.040 -0.028 -0.001
 (0.027) (0.019) (0.017) (0.032) (0.024) (0.020)
Attending a Semi-private
school
-0.010 -0.015 -0.012 0.010 -0.024 -0.008
 (0.014) (0.012) (0.010) (0.016) (0.015) (0.011)
Attending an urban school -0.001 -0.010 -0.006 -0.032** -0.010 -0.022**
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.010) (0.016) (0.016) (0.011)
Mean payoff of neighbors in
previous round
0.004*** 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.000 0.001** 0.000
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Payoff in previous round -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.006***
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.467*** 0.445*** 0.472*** 0.478*** 0.408*** 0.461***
 (0.020) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.020) (0.018)
Observations 30200 31250 61450 34428 35625 70053
Number of id 604 625 1229 625 604 1229
R-squared 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
Note: Sample consists of final-year high school students from Aragon (Spain). Standard errors in parenthesis. We estimate the following equation: Cijt=αi+βXi+δGameijt
+εijtwhere Cijt represents the decision (cooperation/defection) by individual “i” in network “j” at round “t”. The dependent variables is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if
individual “i” in network “j” at round “t” decided to cooperate, and takes value 0 if he/she decided to defect. The vector Xi includes participant’s “i” demographic characteristics
such as gender (1= male, 0=female), number of siblings and the field of the bachelor (1=humanities, 0=science), while Gameijt includes game variables from the previous
round. *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level.
doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0083700.t003
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